the goal of this group is the destruction of zionism which i applaud
but i have respectfully declined the invitation and i cannot forbear to comment
to those pro-Pal activists who i know have joined this group
about the the major difference between these two social ideologies _
to my (perhaps simplistic?) mind socialism is primarily about universality
which has nothing whatsoever to do with the supremacy of one group or culture over any other _ whereas fascism has everything to do with such beliefs _
and in this respect i believe that fascism is in fact closer to zionism than it is to socialism _

some might argue that the end justifies every means of getting there _
and in the desperate situation that the Palestinians find themselves in
such an argument holds considerable sway _
but i wonder how difficult it would be to convince a more moderate audience of this idea when they are confronted with the infamous symbolism of the swastika

more importantly there is a very real danger
that use of such a symbol will play into the enemy’s hands!!
for far too long zionists have got away with murder and pillage
by screaming “anti-semitic!” at anyone who protests against their evil activities
however since the Gaza massacre last year the ‘anti-semitic’ card has lost a lot of its power and i strongly believe that the struggle to detach anti-zionism from anti-semitism will be dealt a serious body blow by any resurgent use of the swastika _

i am more than happy to engage in serious intellectual discussion
with anyone who believes that socialism and fascism have ideological similarities
but i hereby call upon the secret group
to consider the possible ramifications of using the swastika symbol
and to drop it at their earliest convenience _

thankyou for reading

can you not hear _ the silence
in the schoolrooms that once were aloud!
reduced to torn pictures still posted on ruins
like the promise of youth disallowed

can you not hear _ the silence
when the water supply is denied
it croaks out a parched cry for justice
and relief from this planned genocide

can you not hear _ the silence
AGAINST THE ACCURSED WALL!
it echoes like wind does round concrete
but those echoes say nothing at all

can you not hear _ the silence
which deafens us with its distress
at the powerful heads of the governments
who say nothing and do even less

can you not hear _ the silence
stretching over the stolen lands
which groans from the weight of the lies that they tell
to whitewash their bloodied hands

can you not hear _ the silence
steel-cold anger in all of our heads
as we stand by the side of the Gazans today
and remember and NEVER FORGET!!

"an Iwo Jima moment"

Graff stated that “a newly deployed force of 10,000 Marines seized the valley last week in one of the biggest operations of the Afghan war, achieving in hours what overstretched NATO troops had failed to achieve in years of fighting.” He goes on to report the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade that mounted the operation with three battalions of troops and dozens of aircraft, met only scattered resistance “so far _ although the Taliban might yet put up more of a fight.”

Brigadier General Larry Nicholson, who commands appeared to boast “We’re not the first coalition force to come through these areas, but we are the first one to stay. Once they realise we are not leaving, they might contest more. But by then we’ll be pretty well dug in.”

Perhaps the reason for this observer’s circumspection is the complete lack of ‘negativity’ in the report.  Graff quotes from several sources that he has interviewed _ a shepherd who tells him “it’s been seven years since he saw a government official,” implying that the last ones were going about their ‘official’ business just before the original US attack on Afghanistan which took place under the code name Enduring Freedom (sic).  Graff also interviewed the British head of a provincial team overseeing foreign aid in the province, who said that until a week ago only about half of Helmand’s population was in areas under government control.  A more sober assessment of the present situation would almost certainly require a longer length of time before passing judgement on how much of the population was now under ‘government’ control.  Graff goes on to exude the pride with which Brigadier General Nicholson reported that “there had not been even one civilian casualty in the first week of the operation,” causing this observer to wonder whether the Marines had achieved all their goals without firing a shot in anger, or if, as has sadly been the case in other operations, all civilian deaths were counted as ‘kills’. Regrettably Graff also neglects to mention the ten dead US soldiers or the seven UK personnel who have also been killed in the last week; together with however many wounded there have been, a figure which admittedly, is normally kept from civilian access/knowledge anyway.

operation Strike of the Sword

On top of all this there is a death-knell in Nicholson’s boast which both he and the Reuters journalist appear to have overlooked.  Whilst the Taliban wisely retreated against superior numbers and a mobile force, they will undoubtedly be back when Graff and Nicholson are no longer ‘immediately available’, and the signs of Taliban resurgence will be the same as always.  Almost certainly they will carry out attacks on Marine patrols and sporadic assaults against the perimeter of their base camp to test the weaknesses and strengths that any stationary target presents to a hostile force.

At the same time the hapless civilians in the area, represented in Graff’s report, will be put under increasing pressure by local Taliban forces who they very likely know both the names and the faces of.  Inevitably the civilians compliance to threats and reprisals from one side will lead to further threats and reprisals from the other.  And so the ‘game of cat and mouse’ will slowly begin, gathering momentum as Afghans are called on to vote in the impending presidential election (upon which this military operation was planned, timed and executed) and continuing at least into the forseeable future.  At least until the winter that is…

The concept of US Marines ‘digging in’ leads to various issues that all need further investigation.  However, this analysis only deals with its historical significance, not to Nicholson’s “Iwo Jima” but to another ‘dug in’ Marine base, which Lyndon Johnson referred to as “that damned Din Bin Foo” during the Vietnam War; the notorious Khe Sanh.  (For further reading this author recommends the ‘personalized account’ of Khe Sanh in ‘Despatches’ written by Michael Herr.)

Khe Sanh _ Vietnam 1968

In 1967 the American command in Saigon believed that ‘insurgent’ combat operations around Khe Sanh during the summer of 1967 were just part of a series of minor offensives in the border regions. That seriously erroneous appraisal was only changed when it was discovered that the North Vietnamese had been moving substantial forces into the area during the fall and winter.  Consequently there was a build-up of Marine forces as well and actions around Khe Sanh commenced when the Marine base became isolated. During a series of desperate actions that lasted 77 days, Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) and the hilltop outposts around it were under constant North Vietnamese ground, artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks.

There are only two major differences between these historical facts and military despatches today.  The first is the added complication of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) use of which may well cut Khan Neshin off from the outside world.  Graff reports that the entire area is “part of an ancient desert smuggling route used to funnel weapons, fighters and drugs across the borders of Pakistan and Iran,” and so access to the superior weaponry so far supplied by Iran will not be impossibly difficult while the Marines are dug in for the inclement Afghan winter.  The second difference pertains to the massing of enemy forces.  One can only hope therefore that the Taliban do not decide to change their tactics simply to take on the ‘sitting duck’ target that the Marine base will present.

The military operation carried out in the last week by US forces was code named ‘Strike of the Sword’.  But a sword is only effective when it is wielded and mobile, not when it is stationary and still less when it is ‘dug in’.  Brigadier General Nicholson’s reference to Iwo Jima is incorrect for many reasons and the ‘enthusiastically positive’ report by Graff (see below) points more to a PR exercise than a serious military one.  What remains to be seen is how the coming winter will deal with the base at Khan Neshin, and how many soldiers and civilians will be forced to suffer death and serious injury for this pre-election ‘stunt’.

map of Khe Sanh 1968 (showing forward firebases and known enemy positions)

Palestinian Flag _ History

1916
Sharif Hussein designs the current flag for the Arab Revolt.

1917
Palestinians raise it as the flag of the Arab National movement.

1947
Arab Ba’ath Party interprets the flag as a symbol of liberation and unity of the whole Arab nation

1948
Palestinian people readopt the flag at the Palestinian conference in Gaza _
The flag is recognized by the Arab League as the flag of the Palestinians.

1964
the flag is endorsed again by the PLO at the Palestinian conference in Jerusalem

Palestinian Flag _ Meaning of Colours

RED

Arab tribes who participated in the conquest of North Africa and Andalusia carried a red flag _ the symbolic colour of the the first republican party in the early days of Islam _

more recently red symbolizes the Ashrafs of the Hijaz and the Hashemites who are descendants of the Prophet

BLACK

in pre-Islamic times black was recognised as the colour of revenge and was worn as a headdress worn in battle

it later became symbolic of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH)

the Abbasid Dynasty of Baghdad (750-1258) took black as a symbol of mourning for the assassination of relatives of the Prophet (pbuh) and in remembrance of the Battle of Karbala

WHITE

the Umayyad Dynasty of Damascus (661-750) adopted white as their symbolic color to represent the Prophet’s first battle at Badr _

the Ummayads wanted to distinguish themselves from the Abbasids, by using white rather than black, as their color of mourning _

GREEN

the Fatimid Dynasty of of Morocco (909-1171) chose green to demonstrate allegiance
to Ali, the Prophet’s cousin, who was once wrapped in a green coverlet in place of the Prophet in order to thwart an assassination attempt

therefore the four colours Red _ Black _ White _ Green
are combined in the flag to show a unification of all beliefs and sub-cultures
the Palestinian Flag represents UNITY!!

recent headlines showing how New Labour cares (sic)

INTRODUCTION

This document has been prepared as a critique of the New Labour Government’s Green Paper entitled ‘Independence, Well-being and Choice’, which was produced by the Department of Health in 2005, under the auspices of Dr John Reid, and which is now (2009) almost fully implemented.

It should be understood from the outset that the perspective of this report is situated at the polemic end of the critical spectrum, perhaps to remind the post-structuralists ‘of every New Labour persuasion’ that Marxist theory also has several ‘persuasions’, and to advise the Health Minister that the best medicine very often has the bitterest taste.

The report comprises three main elements.

• Part 1: “Independence, Well-being and Choice”:A Critical Response_

briefly considers the excerpted document, providing an ongoing commentary as it examines the government’s proposals, reasoning and evidence.

• Part 2: Realistic Causes and Effects_

produces evidence from ‘external’ data showing recent societal ‘trends of caring’ that do much to explain current governmental and ministerial attitudes, and which demonstrate ‘structural aspects’ in the mutual constitution of personal lives and social policy.

• Part 3: An Analysis of Formal Social Care_

comments ‘concisely’ on the Minister’s vision of the social workforce before moving to a more serious consideration of problems experienced by professional carers.

__________________________

Independence, Well-being and Choice : A Critical Response

SEEING THROUGH THE SMOKE AND MIRRORS

Prolix documents are defined by their repetiveness, lack of clarity and openess to self-contradiction, but the ‘wordiness’ of this Green Paper very probably has purpose.  Whilst appearing to concern itself with ‘improving the organisation of social care’ and providing various definitons of ‘care’ and ‘carers’ throughout, the keyword of its main proposal is ‘organisation’; although a more precise term would be ‘re-organisation’.  To all intents and purposes, the Paper announces reallocation of “available” State funding, essentially passing the buck of administration to already over-burdened local authorities and requiring ‘individuals in need’ to manage their own risk in the future; circumstances that a professor of social work at Kingston University refers to as “choosing how to cut their own care” (Jones, 2008, p3).

EXACERBATING THE SYMPTOMS OF SOCIETY’S SICKNESS

The reasoning behind these proposals is contained in several references to the changing face of ‘modern society’, in which “people can become isolated… (because) work means people are away from home (and) separate from their neighbours”.  In his foreword the Minister exhorts that “we forget the bedrock of care… from family, friends and neighbours at our peril”.  Fink agrees with this sentiment but elucidates, charging that: “in recent years caring as activity might be seen as increasingly separated from those relationships” (2004, p15, emphasis added).

Despite ministerial claims, the proposed alterations in ‘formal care’ are not about supporting the reciprocity inherent in close care relationships which are part of the glue of social cohesion.  Instead the Green Paper repeatedly states an intention to promote personal “independence” from care services (Sections 1.3 & 4.29) with aspirations of making both ‘carers’ and ‘cared for’ contribute positively (Sections 1.3, 2.3 &5.3) to modern society.  Whilst expressing a desire to not weaken the existing framework that protects people (Section 4.3), these proposals do just that.  In other words, the government is exacerbating the underlying symptoms of modern, ‘post-structural’ social dissolution, by actively promulgating policies of the Neo-Liberal disease that is actually causing them.

‘INVALID’ EVIDENCE ?

As to evidence in support of the Minister’s reasoning; there are three instances of implied public consultation in the document.  Two of these begin “Carers told us that…”.   Unfortunately, we are not told if any more than a handful were consulted or whether their number was statistically relevant.  Worse, the people most affected by these proposals, those being ‘cared for’, appear to have had negligible input; exposing a ‘traditionally patriarchal’ view of ‘invalids’ from a Green Paper professing a new and modern approach… or is it more than that?

Fink cites Lloyd on the subject: “In privileging the views of carers’ organisations, the government has failed to grasp an opportunity to develop more inclusive and creative ideas about the nature of care and support” (2004, p13).   However in the second part of this report ‘Realistic Causes and Effects’, this ‘failure’ is posited not only as intentional, but indeed an integral part of current welfare policy.

__________________________

Realistic Causes and Effects

PICTURES THAT REPAINT (1000) MINISTERIAL WORDS

As well as the front cover ‘illustrations’ of this government’s ‘social care’ policies, this report has customised existing data of social trends about ‘care in our community’ (sic):

statistical data = ‘Trends in sympathy for the poor’ - British Social Attitudes, NCSR 2008, p242

The reader’s attention is drawn to the following details:

• Trends to do with ‘fate/destiny’ appear largely unchanged, whereas ‘social’ causes display a marked difference.
• An apparent correlation between trends, blaming individual ‘agency’ against the ‘structure’ of society.
• A clear upward or downward ‘jump’ in percentages, around the time of New Labour’s ‘landslide’ victory; a pattern repeated in other data.

statistical data = ‘Trends in sympathy for the poor’ - British Social Attitudes, NCSR 2008, p243

IDENTIFYING ‘BOGUS CLAIMS’

Highlighting the 1990 Conservative election victory is pertinent when considering the introduction of both the Citizen’s and Patient’s Charters shortly thereafter.  According to Lewis, the late 1980’s saw “the re-emergence of a well-known welfare subject from the past: that of the ‘undeserving’ or ‘welfare scrounger’.   She asserts this terminology was a symptom of the ‘hard divide’ being politically constructed between legitimate welfare claimants and those who were a ‘drain on the nation’s resources’ (1998, pp 72 & 73).

statistical data = ‘Trends in sympathy for the poor’ - British Social Attitudes, NCSR 2008, p243

Reasons for including this data are essentially three-fold:

• to expose the structural influences of Neo-Liberalist economic philosophy, which spurns a cohesive ‘collectivist’ social model in favour of individualism; wherein the welfare state is described by Cavadino and Dignan as “minimalist and residual, consisting mainly of means-tested welfare benefits, entitlement to which is often heavily stigmatized” (2006, p440).
• to highlight the interdependence between a government and its citizens; wherein the National Centre for Social Research (NCSR) reports that considerations of attitudes are important “both because it may be possible for government to influence perceptions… beliefs and values, and because government policy platforms are likely to be influenced themselves by the subjective orientation of the electors to whom they must appeal” (NCSR, 2008, p249).
• to identify the Minister’s bogus claim of “increased public expectations”, as if the government’s socio-economic ideology plays no part in this sad affair (Executive Summary).

THE FREE MARKET KILL OR CURE-ALL

Here then, is the realistic evidence of UK society and policy: ‘mutually constituted’ between citizens and policy-makers, who solved the maladies of their former social democratic system with a ‘free market kill or cure-all’, where the “status and well-being of citizens is heavily dependent on how well they succeed in the marketplace of the economy” (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006, p242).   According to James, high levels of adult mental illness (which doubled in the UK population during this same period) are actually essential in the “Blatcherist” social model, “because needy, miserable people make greedy consumers” who can be encouraged to work harder and longer.

“Or maybe you collapse and join the sickness benefit queue, leaving it to people shipped in to do the low-paid jobs that society has taught you are too demeaning – let alone the unpaid ones, like looking after children or elderly parents, which are beneath contempt in the Nouveau Labour liturgy”

(James, 2008, p28)

Williams and Deacon appear to agree, stating that the ethics which “enable resilience… facilitate commitment and lie at the heart of people’s interdependency” are ignored by current policy debate.  They conclude that “the emphasis on work overshadows care; interdependency is the poor relation of economic self-sufficiency” (2004, p8).  Under such circumstances, it is accurate to assert that ‘failure’ to develop more inclusive ideas about the nature of care and support is actually an integral part of current welfare policy.

In part three, ‘An Analysis of Formal Social Care’, this report considers the complexity of tensions and experiences of care professionals when administering the government’s ‘uncaring’ care policies.

__________________________

An Analysis of Formal Social Care

THE ‘VISION’  FROM THE IVORY TOWER

The Green Paper makes several references to social care practitioners and the ‘social workforce’, conceding from the outset that, without “the support of the social care workforce… our society would collapse” (Foreword).  This comment, along with others, amounts to little more than a ‘statement of the obvious’ and, in the face of present front line welfare realities, their inclusion in a ‘consultation document’ actually borders on insulting…  Apparently “in future”, care professionals, who should be “open, honest, warm, empathetic and respectful”, can look forward to “competing demands” on their “available” work force.  (Further ‘ironic’ observations on this collated summary of the Minister’s comments would demean the serious nature of this report’s overall response.)

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

According to Fink, psychoanalytic approaches to social work have been greatly reduced since the 1970’s, as the result of ‘Leftist’ reaction to too much ‘psycho-babble’ which detracted from structural causes in people’s welfare experiences (2004, p20).  However, certain aspects of psychoanalysis remain useful, not least when applied to social care workers and their various personal or institutional methods of ‘self-protection’, that hinge on the delineation between care as ‘dimunition’ or ‘activity’.  Boundaries between doing care work and being a caring individual are acknowledged as ‘unstable and overlapping’.  “Time spent listening to clients, calming their fears or negotiating their anger, is assumed to be part of what care workers do but not what they are paid for. Equally, the management of the care worker’s emotions after distressing or frustrating encounters with clients is seldom considered. ” (Fink, 2004, p31)

A recent media report concerning the huge amount of vacancies in social care may point to job seeker’s concerns about coping with this phemomenon.  Equally, the problem of recruiting could well be accounted for by the simple fact that many care ‘professionals’ are working exhaustively on the basic minimum wage (BBC, 26/01/09).

THE FRONT LINE REALITY

This report would fail itself if it only considered the academic concepts and complexities of social care but gave no space to the actuality of present ‘front line’ conditions.   The following excerpts are from an anonymous commentary printed in The Society Guardian:

(Comments in the narrative that are pertinent to other aspects of the report are underlined.)

“I drop my child off at school early, so I can arrive at a foster carer’s home on time, collect a child and drop him off at school.  We’re short-staffed and no-one else is available; third time this week.  I rush back to the office, attend two child protection case conferences, four home visits and an investigative interview with the Police Family Protection Unit.

I take 16 phone-calls from clients, foster carers, criminal justice workers, health visitors and schools.  One client due to be evicted. A domestic incident. A family with no money for the weekend.  Some calls are worrying but I can’t respond. I have to focus on the task at hand. I quickly inform my line manager.  “No-one available” he replies, “have to wait till next week.”

There are not enough hours in the day.  ‘Prioritising’ is a buzzword.  ‘Crisis’ is another.  Things are deteriorating.  Extreme stress predominates.  Tempers flare. We complain incessantly, on behalf of our clients, for our sanity.  I’m sinking. I have clients I haven’t seen for months.  No offer to reduce my caseload is forthcoming.  Instead, I am allocated another two.

I look around and my colleagues are all feeling the pressure too.  Several off on long-term sick leave and some left in the last few months for less pressurised jobs. They won’t be replaced.  Budget deficit, we’re told. “There will be no new social workers employed.  Live with it.”             (26/11/08, pp1&2).

__________________________

CONCLUSIONS

Many sociological theorists agree that ‘contemporary’ theoretical perspectives have been influenced by Marxist concepts of struggle between the individual and the State.  Consequently, this critique has largely considered New Labour’s document; ‘Independence, Well-being and Choice’ from a Marxist perspective.  Such orientation is pertinent to the Green Paper because it includes questions of ‘hegemony of state’, personal relationships re-shaped by cultural processes and aspects of ‘dehumanization’.

From this perspective it is posited that, rather than being ‘presented for consultation’, the only purpose of the policy document was to announce changes in the organisation of social care, with a central ambition of making welfare beneficiaries responsible for managing their own risk.   This report has rejected the professed ‘reasoning’ for these changes and criticised both the lack and the content of evidence provided to support them.

Instead the report has offered its own evidence of structural influences of the re-shaping of society and even attempted to marry this evidence to what some theorists refer to as ‘mutual’ constitution.   The report has argued that continued weakening of welfare structures conforms to Neo-Liberal ideology, and suggested that the rise in mental suffering in the UK over the last two decades serves commercial interests, to the detriment of personal ones.  The report has ridiculed the Health Minister’s comments and concepts of social care work, describing them as an insult and asserting that social conditions, for care givers and receivers alike, are set to deteriorate further.  The report charges that present government ideology is unconcerned about this deterioration.

Finally, the author has been asked to divine possible advantages and disadvantages to the proposed reorganisation scheme.   But from the outset this report has only ever been about ‘disadvantage’, and it considers the only ‘advantage’ to these proposals is their provision of an opportunity to respond, and hopefully render the Health Minister and his ilk an enduring image of ‘resistance’.

__________________________

References

“… This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government… we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. In… government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.  We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.  We should take nothing for granted…

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.  In this revolution, research has become central… more formalized…  A steadily increasing share is conducted… at the direction of the Federal government.  Today, the solitary inventor… has been overshadowed by… scientists in laboratories… The free university, historically the fountainhead of ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research… (where) a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity… domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present – and is gravely to be regarded.  In holding scientific research and discovery in respect… we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.”

(US President Dwight D Eisenhower _ Farewell Speech 17^th January 1961)

The title of this essay has been formulated from a quasi-academic paper published in 1989 by Fukuyama, which proposes that, with the apparent collapse of communism and the celebrated fall of Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’, the ‘ending of history’ (defined as the ‘perfecting of society’) and hence, the end-point of the evolution of political ideas, has been achieved with the ‘victory’ and dominance of market forces and Liberal Democracy.

This paper will refute that concept unconditionally.  It will briefly outline Fukuyama’s proposals, such as they are, but rather than devoting much space to their analysis and deconstruction, the essay will question Fukuyama’s purpose, highlighting his work as symbolic of the increasingly ‘directed’ and superficial research predicted by Eisenhower.  The essay will focus on several samples of complete commentaries (from which the patchy excerpts included in the DD306 study materials were drawn) and, conjuncting these with current socio-cultural cases, this author will attempt to create the antithetic position to Fukuyama’s conclusions; demonstrating that the evolution of political ideas is indeed alive and continuing to adapt to new social environments, despite the best efforts of ‘market forces’ to take control or the increasingly authoritarian measures that Western ‘liberal democracy’ has recently introduced to circumvent social resistance.  The essay will lastly conclude that history and mankind’s search for a perfect society are not ended.

In an interview discussion between Thompson and Cox; Thompson suggests that “Fukuyama’s ideas are argued to have played a crucial role in formulating post 1990s US foreign policy” (Open University (2008) ‘The end of the Cold War and Fukuyama ‘, 01:18).   More accurately, Fukuyama is recognised by historians and academics as being a key figure in the rise of American neo-conservatism, and though he latterly distanced himself from their increasing disrepute and unpopularity, eventually becoming what is known on ‘the Beltway’ as an ‘Obamacan’, Fukuyama still counts among his friends and associates several prominent Zionists employed in key positions in the Bush administration; namely Libby, Weinberg and Wolfowitz.

Noting this political persuasion is pertinent when considering the largely ambivalent attitude that Fukuyama’s paper clearly has towards anything Islamic.  For example, his essay was written a full ten years after the fall of the Shah of Iran, yet despite a series of major incidents involving that country which seriously affected US politics over the next decade (including the Hostage Crisis and the Iran-Contra Affair) Fukuyama’s tone is deliberately demeaning: “if a new Ayatollah proclaimed the millennium from a desolate Middle Eastern capital” (The End of History?, 1989, preamble).  This negativity does not serve him well.  After all, his thesis deals with the perfection of society through market forces, yet in his next reference to Tehran, where he writes of “the regime’s pretensions of restoring a state based on the rule of the Shariah” (The End of History?, 1989, part III), he does not take a moment to refer to ‘Shariah economics’, which include policies of taxation that are specifically aimed at assisting the poor (zakat) and the sharing of ‘risk’ between lender and borrower, to prevent any extremes of disparity between the parties in the event of a failed venture (gharar).  In fact social responsibility is written into every aspect of Shariah economics, where no interest rate is allowed and all loans must be ethically based (Islamic economics in the world, wikipedia).  But perhaps such benevolence is not considered relevant to the neo-conservative model of a ‘perfect liberal society’.

And Fukuyama’s ignorance of Islam extends to his claims of ‘universality’ for liberal democracy as well.  According to readily available statistics, one in four humans on the planet is Muslim.  Across the globe Muslims have increased by over 235% in the last fifty years. This compares with a combined rise in the other three main world religions of 227%. (islamicweb.com/begin/results.htm).  Whilst many Muslims live in Western countries where the governments pretend to democracy, nevertheless, and at time of writing, there are major conflict zones in the Middle East where casualty rates number at least in tens of thousands, and where the primary reason for war is the implementation of, or resistance to, Fukuyama’s ‘universal’ panacea.

Citing Hegel, Fukuyama claims the ‘End of History’ began nearly two centuries prior to his thesis, after Napoleon’s victory at the Battle of Jena in 1806, “because it was at that point that the vanguard of humanity (a term quite familiar to Marxists) actualized the principles of the French Revolution”.  Fukuyama describes in some detail Hegel’s belief that “history culminated in an absolute moment… in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious”.  But he bemoans the fate that awaited Hegel, gaining renown mainly as Marx’s precursor, and describes him instead as “the first philosopher to speak the language of modern social science”.  Fukuyama’s ‘1806 thesis’ was promoted as an alternative explanation of Hegel’s work, by Aleksandre Kojeve who, although unknown in the US, “had a major impact on intellectual life on the continent… post-war existentialism borrowed many of its basic categories from Hegel via Kojève” (1989, all in part I).  This assertion flies in the face of the more popular understanding of existentialism originating from the likes of Heidegger, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

As to Fukuyama’s own analysis of the End of History; despite the extraordinary length of its apparent demise, encompassing not least the conflagration of two World Wars, he states that it still isn’t over!  However he posits the ‘victory of liberalism’ as occurring primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness so far, and, as yet, incomplete in the real world; “But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run” (1989, preamble).  Twenty years after that statement was made, as the world still reels in the aftermath of neo-conservative ‘foreign policy’, it is obviously easier to point to the ‘powerful reasons’ which refute his argument.

Returning to the discussion between Cox and Thompson, on the ‘End of the Cold War and Fukuyama’, Cox appears to be dismissive of Fukuyama’s ‘new theory’, emphasising in particular, his title ‘The End of History’.  Prompted by Thompson, who pointedly remarks on the “enduring attractiveness” of simple, convenient theories “at that level “, Cox responds “if you want to become a famous academic _ also get the right title for the article you’ve written _ I mean he ran into the political/historical box at exactly the right moment” (Open University (2008) ‘The end of the Cold War and Fukuyama ‘, 12:47).  The message from both appears clear to a discerning audience; that Fukuyama’s brand of scholastic theorizing fails to meet their own academic standards.

Gray is more forthright in his criticism of Fukuyama’s theoretical prowess, in a scathing review of the (inevitable?) book which followed on from the original essay; in which Fukuyama describes his ‘Mechanism’ that defines the linear properties of his history.  Gray sums up the thread of Fukuyama’s overly detailed analysis in a couple of sentences: “The Mechanism… (invoked) to sustain the directionality of history is… a compound of two ideas: Hegel’s, as interpreted by Fukuyama’s other mentor… Kojeve; and what Fukuyama himself describes as ‘a kind of Marxist interpretation of history that leads to a completely non-Marxist conclusion’, namely, an economic interpretation of history that explains the growth of human productive powers by the development of scientific knowledge and its exploitation by human beings” (1992, p 2).  Gray’s own intellectual and scholastic superiority are evident throughout his review, as is his amused dismissal of Fukuyama’s theory.  He makes comedic references to the author’s work, such as ‘Pollyannaish’ and ‘Monty Pythonish’, and he clearly delights in publicising anecdotal evidence of Fukuyama’s limited grasp of European political systems and British history.  But Gray ends his review of the other’s book on a far more serious note; having first warned of Fukuyama’s ‘perilous and debilitating’ influence on Western thinking that “panders to the hopes and illusions of democracies”; Gray goes on to assert that “the coming century looks to be, not the end of history, but a tragic epoch in which history resumes along traditional lines… on a vaster scale, an epoch of Malthusian wars and religious and ethnic convulsions, of ecological catastrophes, forced migrations, and mass deaths overshadowing those of our century” (1992, pp 1-3).

In the same year that Fukuyama produced The End of History, Berners-Lee wrote a document concerning information management and ‘hypertext’ for local perusal and commentary at the CERN institute.  It would still be another five years before the EEC and CERN cooperated on the WebCore project and the World Wide Web Consortium was founded (www.w3.org/History.html).  The resultant benefits of hindsight and experiencing the ‘Information Age’ first hand, makes most of us more knowledgeable than Fukuyama was.  At time of writing, the restrictive structure of ‘liberal democracy’ and the hegemony of ‘market forces’ are attempting to combat new globally-social phenomena such as the revolutionary effects of networking and the financial destabilization incurred through ‘illegal downloading’.   Popular protests against governmental policies are now organised with extraordinary speed and domestic political concerns are no longer ‘regionalised’.  To take only one example from the plethora of new international social movements; the BDS (Boycott, Divest, Sanction) campaign against the ethnic cleansing of Palestine by an apartheid regime continues to have a profound effect on the financial and foreign affairs of Israel, even though the world’s leaders remain largely ineffective and even latently condone the genocide that Zionist policies promote (www.bdsmovement.net).

Fukuyama might argue that such progress has been accounted for in his theory, but it is clear that he in no way envisaged the global internet revolution that was about to occur.

As to the future of living political ideas; the democratic power of every individual in the global community (as originated in ancient Athenian society) has been returned to them, not by liberal democratic ‘values’, but by their own resourcefulness with the new ‘web technology’.  And whilst environmental issues received, at best, only lip-service from neo-conservatism, there is little doubt that they will need to become a part of the foundation for new international understanding and agreements.  As Huysmans states: “the challenge of environmental degradation may well go beyond simply needing to find a more environmentally sustainable economic model _ one problem in Green politics is that Nature was excluded from the political sphere _ the issue here is one of the central questions in (new) political theory” (Open University (2008) ‘ How do political ideas live?,  07:30).

This paper has attempted to argue the case against Fukuyama’s End of History by various means which have not included a conventional deconstruction of his theory.  The author has demonstrated at some length that such analysis is not warranted for a number of reasons; Fukuyama’s ideas have been shown to be ‘opportunistic’ and to show a political bias towards neo-conservatism.  His work also contains a considerable level of inaccuracy, not only because it is largely ‘unacademic’ but also because it is becoming increasingly outdated as world history moves forward into a wholly new epoch created by global warming and the ‘Information Age’.  In point of fact, and in this new environment where the risks of a man-made ecological cataclysm have still to be competently addressed by ‘liberal economic policy’, the title of Fukuyama’s paper, ‘The End of History?’ takes on a different and much darker meaning.

References

Confusion and a False Dichotomy: Restoration / Retribution

When headmaster Phillip Lawrence died from a knife wound outside his school in 1995, a saga began to unfold that continues to the present day.  At time of writing the Home Office, having already lost its appeal case, is seeking an injunction in the High Court to force the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal into reconsidering its decision not to deport Learco Chindamo, who had stabbed the headmaster when he was only 15 years old.

Chindamo is 26 now; due for parole in 2008.  Knowingly or not, he has the potential to become a prison ‘success story’; a “young man full of bravado, lacking maturity and self restraint” and illiterate when he began his sentence, he has since passed maths & English GCSEs and an NVQ in Health and Social Care.  When his original application to stay was successful, because “his family and life were in the UK”; he issued a statement expressing deepest sympathy and “hope the decision would not cause grief to Philip Lawrence’s widow” (BBC website, 21/08/07).  Despite all this, the media’s concentration has remained on Mrs Lawrence’s reaction, reporting she was “unutterably depressed” and “devastated and demoralised by the ruling”, a response that might seem ‘natural’ under such circumstances.  But in 2003 Mrs Lawrence was reported to have “blown a kiss” to the young man her husband died saving, as he was ‘taken down’ to serve a four year sentence for possession of a firearm, his second prison term in a five year period.

Clearly, Phillip Lawrence’s widow does not shrink from publicly expressing her ‘mixed’ emotions; a veritable treasure trove for journalists in search of a sound bite.   Her power as a media ‘angel’ has potential that is arguably equivalent to its antithesis, the ‘moral devil’, which might explain the Home Office’s persistent and “robust” attempts to deport Chindamo; enhanced by the vested interest it has in an awards scheme set up in memory of Mrs Lawrence’s husband (BBC website, 21/02/03 &20/08/07).  For all that; however sympathetic we might be for the Lawrences, or indeed for the ‘reformed’ Chindamo, surely the real tragedy of this saga is in just how much it symbolises the inherent disarray, found not only in the practical application of UK criminal justice, but in our social construction of crime, and rehabilitation / punishment.

The purpose of this essay is to promote the case for an ‘alternative’ ideology to current thinking/support for the UK’s present ‘Retributive Justice’ system, which enjoys almost hegemonic socio-political status (sic).  The essay is supposed to argue the case for a ‘restorative’ approach and to conform to this requirement it will indeed ‘touch’ on some of the diverse origins and propositions of Restorative Theory, prior to examining examples of practical implementation.  It will also consider some critical issues surrounding both theory and practice.

However, in its examination of Restorative Justice this paper intends to highlight the ‘symbiotic’ relationship between Retribution and Restoration.  In places in this text words relating to Restorative theory or practice will be replaced with combined terms, such as ‘restorative / retributive’, in order to bring out this aspect.  The essay will argue ‘by example’, that ever more dissertation about the apparent dichotomy between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ options simply promulgates a false prospectus, and that ‘division’ between Restorative / Retributive confounds an already confused social mindset that is plagued by media and haunted by ‘folk devils’, reinforced by academic research and exacerbated by political and corporate self-interest; all of which must be overcome before any social clarity about crime and ‘punishment’ is actually achievable.  Lastly, the essay will posit a ‘consensus’ solution, similar to that attained for the ‘Social Democratic’ project that created the UK’s Welfare State, as the best method of restructuring our collective ‘retributive’ nature and acquiring greater pellucidity over the problem of crime.

Origins and Theory

Diversity on Origins, Discordance in Propositions

Discord breeds confusion; competing criminological theories translated into muddled social policy are only one sorry outcome.  Such jumble is evident in theory even around seemingly impractical issues such as the ancestry of Restorative Justice; researched, according to McLaughlin, because it lends support for Restorative advocates and is a defence against its detractors, because “history… provides credibility”.  Proposals for projects, which are normally resisted because they consist of “informal methods”, are thereby helped towards possible acceptance and recognition (McLaughlin et al, 2003, p2).

However, this author argues that concern about ‘credibility’ is not specific to restorative / retributive justice theory; it is a symptom of the pandemic ‘self-questioning’ suffered throughout sociological science, an overall issue that won’t be resolved by historical research.  ‘Looking backwards’ into matters criminological may have more practical use; justifying its cost in time/resources by passing on the traditions it discovers succinctly.  But if McLaughlin’s assertion about ‘academic defence’ is correct, a refocusing on successfully handing down practical social wisdom would require an ending of disputes between ‘criminologists’ in search of credibility.

Be that as it may; McLaughlin continues in a compactly detailed introduction, highlighting various ‘anthropological resources’ for restorative methods of conflict-resolution that once dominated “non-state, pre-state and early state societies”.  He cites Hadley’s collection of these customs, which reveal restorative values “in philosophy, doctrine (and) tradition” (McLaughlin et al, 2003, p2&3).   However, McLaughlin later praises the critical work of Kathleen Daly as “one of very few sustained deconstructions of… restorative justice”; in which she ‘contends’ the existence of “four myths” canted by its proponents.  Daly’s paper attempts to provide structure to the quagmire of Restorative theory that may prove useful to ‘drowning’ criminology students.  It should however be remembered that her primary purpose was demolition.   In debunking her ‘second myth’ Daly questions the authoritative value of these histories of ancient custom.  She regards them as imaginings about “golden days of yore” (2003, p14), which, respectfully, is hardly ‘authoritative’.

Her ‘first myth’ should also be noted, for this essay’s position on the existence of a false dichotomy.  According to McLaughlin, Daly describes the language of dualism in restorative / retributive justice as a “sales pitch”, which she accuses of “oversimplifying the complex, inter-dependent relationship between the two modes of justice” (2003, p14).

One historical resource, of interest to this essay’s theme, is the Lex Talionis.  The retributive quality of an “an eye for an eye” from the Old Testament is ‘common knowledge’ to all good Christians.  Other commentators claim it is a statement about ‘misuse of power’.  Even Mahatma Ghandi is quoted as saying ‘an eye for an eye makes the whole world blind’.  Nevertheless, Burnside argues this is all a misunderstanding of translation, expressing the possibility that the Talionis is an innocent treatise on compensation.  He cites Daube: “The word ‘for’ (tachat) can mean ‘in the place of’ – that is to say, one thing being given in the place of another”, before continuing, “‘life for life’ (e.g. Exodus 21 v23) points towards… the return of a living creature for a dead one” (2007, p138).  Unfortunately, Burnside’s biblical thesis neglects to address how, in the first instance, the retributive version of ‘an eye for an eye’ found its way into our social consciousness.  And the counterpoint between Hadley and Daly, Ghandi and Burnside, exposes a common pattern in criminological literature; theoretical assertion followed up by equally convincing contradiction.  These disputes appear to give their variant claims more substance.  Referencing to them, resourcing from them; this somehow increases their ‘legitimacy’.  No-one is actually ‘wrong’, and so everyone is right; social conditions similar to those ‘reputed’ to have been prevalent in ‘historic’ Babel.

Amongst the diversity of theoretical propositions on Restorative Justice, McLaughlin’s team make several pertinent observations; not least that ‘RJ’ offers “a much broader critique than… pointing to the limitations of the criminal justice system” (McLaughlin et al, 2003, p4).  Using terms like ‘Third Way’, they argue Restorative Justice has a superior ‘social reach’ to its Retributive counterpart; it “deals with how the social is ordered”, is “informal” and “participatory” (2003, p1).  Whilst the latter term might at least engender some sympathy from ‘retributive advocates’, ‘informal’ has already been posited by McLaughlin as a focal point of division.  Conversely, Miller and Blackler state that the phrase ‘restorative justice’ is used to refer to an “extraordinarily wide and diverse range of formal and informal interventions” (emphasis added, in Miers, 2001, p4).   The above statement undermines McLaughlin’s justification for historical research even further, and this author questions why ‘informal’ is used at all if it causes dispute.  An altering of terminology to promote consensus would, perhaps, be timely and appropriate.

Nevertheless confusion continues to dominate the subject: Miers cites Marshall’s 1999 ‘comprehensive overview’ of restorative justice as central to his own 2001 review of UK Restorative Justice programmes, which this essay will deal with later.  He states that Marshall ‘draws attention’ to the pluralism of Restorative programmes, concluding that “Restorative justice is not… a single academic theory of crime or justice, but represents, in (an) eclectic way, the accretion of actual experience in working successfully with particular crime problems” (Marshall in Miers, 2001, p8).  Now consider Marshall’s assertion again.  Cannot exactly the same be said of ‘retributive’ justice?

As further evidence of ‘symbiosis’; within this myriad of Restorative propositions and proponents, Burnside’s paper apparently speaks as much for God Himself as it does for retribution’s value to restorative theory: His “just acts” are clear examples “firstly, that retribution has a role to play in securing justice” and “secondly, it paves the way for restoration” (2007, p137).   But again, aren’t these the same thing?

The overall message from Restorative advocates is that they are not; ‘justice’ is one thing, ‘restoration’ another.  McLaughlin argues that current (UK/retributive) justice arrangements actually separate ‘justice’ from ‘community’, leading to “dissatisfaction and social discord” (McLaughlin et al, 2003, p1).  So neither as individual victims, nor even as a social group, are we ‘restored’ from criminal acts.

Marshall gives readers a rudimentary diagram (See Fig1 below) and defines restorative justice in relation to ‘criminal justice’ rather than using the ‘retributive’ label: “Restorative Justice (is) criminal justice embedded in its social context, with… stress on relationships to other components, rather than a closed system in isolation” (1999, p5).

Fig 1. Integration between all the agents involved in a crime           (Source: Marshall 1999)

Restorative exponents prefer alternative discourses to ‘crime’, such as ‘harm’ or ‘conflict-resolution’.   Christie’s paper on the ownership of ‘conflict’, which begins with “Maybe we should not have any criminology”, argues that conflict is part of the life-blood of society: “Conflicts might kill, but too little of them might paralyse”.  Nevertheless, he sees a need for officialdom and structure; “Without them, private vengeance and vendettas will blossom” (Christie in McLaughlin et al, 2003, p21).

Hillyard and Tombs argue that in the constructed sense ‘crime’ has no ontological reality.  As to punishment, they cite Hulsman: “as so many acts are… ‘crimes’, a standard(ised)… punishment cannot a priori be assumed to be effective” (2005, p8).  All of which suggests a need to refocus on things that are ‘existent’, such as ‘harm’.

Nevertheless, and despite repeatedly demonstrating the already emergent ‘shared interest’ of restorative / retributive terminology, this paper must provide words and concepts, such as ‘participatory’, ‘social order’, ‘community’, ‘experience’, ‘harm’ and ‘conflict-resolution’, as the supposed essence of Restorative proposition.

Practical Implementation

Criminal Justice Acts and Realistic Data

Christie’s paper on conflict argues that the victim of crime is a ‘double-loser’.  Not only has the offender caused them injury but “often in a more crippling manner” they have been denied the right to participating in officialdom’s redress of the crime.  The victim is reduced to merely “triggering off” a criminal process by complaining about an offence.  Although they might be present during proceedings they are rarely asked to ‘partake’ in them.  As such, “they have lost their case to the state” (Christie in McLaughlin et al, 2003, p22).

In his International Review of Restorative Justice Procedures Miers reports ‘substantial growth’ in restorative justice provision over three decades.  More than once he cites Christie’s paper as directly affecting European nations’ crime and justice policies:

In the case of Austria:  “At a theoretical level, the Vienna Institute for the Sociology of Law and Deviance was both influenced… and influential in, disseminating at policy level Christie’s notion of the reappropriation of conflicts” (Miers, 2001, p10).  A 1999 directive organises agencies and protocols about how contact between offender and victim are to be conducted. Article 167 of Austrian penal code lists offences not liable for prosecution where an offender voluntarily makes good the damage done.  Of equal importance to offender rehabilitation is Article 42, which stipulates no criminal record of these ‘restored’ cases (2001, p7).   French statutes allow the prosecutor to decide on mediation.  Article 61(b) orders restorative action from the offender prior to sentencing.  German law distinguishes between victim-oriented measures that can be taken without a trial, and those which follow from a trial.  Whilst no ‘restorative’ statute exists in Holland the HALT programme provides for restoration including compensation, where the offender undertakes unpaid work or enrols in an education project.  Norway boasts ‘mediation boards’ that have jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases.

Miers reports that in Poland, “the philosophy of the Juvenile Justice Act has historically been offender-oriented. While accommodating… public interest, the Law on Juvenile Responsibility provides that criminal justice principles… be primarily in the best interests of the young person… Article 65 of the Juvenile Justice Act (states) the objective… is to encourage juveniles to accept social and civic responsibilities” (2001, p56).  Ireland has set up an independent, multi-agency ‘Mediation Bureau’, which begins to function only after a guilty verdict has been reached.

Meanwhile, in the UK, both the Criminal Justice Act 1991 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 present avenues for restorative responses to crime, especially for youth offenders.  The 1991 Act requires ‘community orders’ to be served on young people where the offender may be required to make reparation to the community or to anyone directly affected by the offence.  The 1998 Act presents a ‘tiered response’ to youth offending.  At the second level young offenders receive a warning and come under the watch of a youth offending team (YOT).  YOTs are part of the local authority. Their purpose is to co-ordinate and monitor programmes of behaviour for young offenders that may include rehabilitation programmes.

Unfortunately, Morris and Gelsthorpe have several criticisms of these measures: “the continued focus on blaming and punishing will subvert… restorative aspirations”, coupled with the likelihood that restorative practices “will develop in a somewhat ad hoc fashion… in the youth justice system, but at no point will the key participants in all of this – offenders, victims and their families… be able to take charge. Victims will no longer be marginalised in quite the same way… but their involvement will hardly be significant”.  Meanwhile offenders may be ‘coerced’ into making reparation, even though “nothing in the research literature suggests that this reduce(s) re-offending” (Morris and Gelsthorpe in Miers et al, 2003, p12).  It therefore becomes necessary to ask what the purpose of these ‘semi-restorative’ processes actually is.  They are either the ‘first steps’ towards a more ‘restorative’ criminal justice approach, or else they were ‘media-driven’ into existence; it largely depends upon the reader’s opinion.  But regardless of criticisms and possible pitfalls in all the above examples, what is important to note is that restorative measures are being legislated for and administered through traditionally ‘retributive’ institutions.  Again Miers, on Polish procedures: “Educational objectives should be given priority… and educational and corrective measures individualised” (emphasis added, 2001, p56).

Another ‘requirement’ is that this essay deals with research from restorative Youth Justice programmes.  So be it.  But rather than considering ‘outcomes’, it will examine what might be referred to as ‘incomes’ instead.  Because, in advocating the use of Restorative justice processes, whether to an imaginary audience or a real one, it is arguably far more important to highlight the factors that lead to their failure, rather than picking through data to pinpoint those elements that promise some sign of success.

Miers’ 2001 ‘Evaluation of Restorative Justice Schemes’ in the UK is a case in point.  Set up by the Home Office to review seven ‘restorative’ projects, five of which were directed towards youth offending and rehabilitation.  However, “by the time the fieldwork began, some important and unforeseen changes had taken place (Miers et al, 2001, p1).  One scheme was almost entirely inactive owing to cuts in resources.  Unfortunately, such news is not rare; in fact it is almost a feature of such projects.  Miers reports that during the evaluation “none of the schemes was in receipt of any Home Office funding” (2001, p2).  And that, in itself, is curious.  In a paper on the ‘policing of valid knowledge’, Whyte argues that present government policy towards funding academic research is based on a ‘principle of utility’ (2002, p2).  If that is so then the question arises; ‘How would it serve the Home Office to set up research on restorative programmes that are already failing?’  In light of the ongoing privatisation of criminal justice the answer seems painfully obvious.  But, as stated by this author elsewhere, such matters are more the provender of conspiracy theorists.

Further on, Miers states that “all the schemes claimed to be involved to some extent in ‘restorative justice’” but concludes that in two of the youth schemes his team researched there were “serious doubts as to whether they can reasonably be called restorative justice schemes at all”  (Miers et al, 2003, p2).   Miers uses the word ‘fragile’ on several occasions, to describe both individual and collective aspects of these ‘restorative’ schemes.  Their success often depended “on work ‘beyond the call of duty’ by small numbers of exceptionally committed individuals”.  It is therefore safe to surmise that without these individuals the projects may not have survived at all.  And even when they received large numbers of referrals from court, “most schemes made unambiguously ‘restorative’ interventions in relatively few cases”.

But if there is a final ‘nail in the coffin’, it comes from Miers’ report on the use of ‘mediation’, where offender and victim confront ‘their’ crime together.  In his introduction Miers emphasises that one purpose of his review was to examine the cost-effectiveness of restorative implementation.  Despite reporting that crime victims who experienced some form of restorative justice were in favour of it, appreciating the opportunity to express themselves; and even though more than 60% believed that intervention had a beneficial impact on the offender it is not difficult to imagine the Home Office response to the following passage: “Whatever its precise form, ‘restorative justice’ is a labour-intensive and time-consuming activity, beset by communication problems and delays. Particularly where direct mediation is contemplated, it can involve weeks of preparatory and exploratory work, and… many cases do not reach the desired conclusion. This situation raises some doubts about the future potential of mediation as a mainstream service capable of ‘processing’ large numbers of cases within (or outside) the criminal justice system” (all in 2003, p (ix)).  In the light of ‘real-life’ reports on costs such as this one, there is arguably little worth in reciting ‘what works’ in restorative programmes.

Critical Issues & Conclusion

The case for Overall Restoration

This paper has not conformed to the required format.  Criticism of ‘restorative justice’ and its proponents is present throughout the document instead of being confined to one section.  As stated in the introduction, the author’s intention has been to avoid what amounts to a set intellectual exercise and argue ‘by example’ that there is no case for examining restorative measures as though they are a separate entity; an ‘alternative’ to the system of criminal justice that already exists.  However, this does not mean that ‘restorative’ philosophy does not have a substantial role to play in the development of criminal justice policy.  In the end, it is not so much a question of replacing a ‘retributive’ system with a ‘restorative’ one.  It is more about supplementing the weaknesses in both of them with the strengths found in their counterpart; the outcome of consensus.  Herein, what is argued is that exclusive concentration on restorative methods almost entirely misses this point.  The essay has shown that even the heaviest critics of present criminal justice procedures, such as Christie, admit the need for the present ‘retributive’ structure and institutions; without them society would descend into chaos.

Instead, the essay has attempted to highlight a fundamentally inseparable connection between ‘restorative / retributive’.  This includes an implication that any criticism of one side of that equation has connotations for the other side as well.  Hence, excessive concern about terms like ‘informal’ indicates reaction to ‘retributive’ rigidity, which ‘restoratives’ attempt to overcome.  Issues like this would be less of a problem if they only involved academic dispute, but overcrowded prisons and public disillusionment are harsh reminders that criminal justice matters affect us all.

If there is an overall criticism specific to ‘restorative’ arguments then it is that their collective message is inconclusive and even, at times, nebulous.  This results in an imbalance of presentation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ options, resulting in societal ‘ignorance’ and confusion.   Because of separate issues of ‘self-interest’, media and politicians expound ‘retributive’ solutions because they are easier to express, easier to understand and accept, and probably easier to implement, since they are usually a continuation of what already exists (i.e. building more prisons).

On a similar tack; the European Commission’s 2005 International Crime & Safety Survey reports UK citizens as being more inclined to jail recidivists than their European counterparts (EU ICS, 2007, p72).  And Walker states that readers of national ‘tabloids’ are likely to think the national crime rate “increased ‘a lot’ in the previous two years” even though it has been in decline for over a decade (Walker et al., 2006),   In his thesis on ‘Changing Public Attitudes’ Allen states that “the general public have lost confidence in criminal justice and are looking instinctively for a simple and robust solution”.  He asserts that citizens “need simple fables in which wrong doers get punished, not cared for” yet “public attitudes are full of contradictions” (2004, p56).  Society seems certain of what it wants; protection from ‘harm’.  But the public is confused in how to achieve it.  The evidence for this is clearly shown in a graph of public respondents who were asked to choose methods for reducing crime, where ‘restorative’ or ‘preventative’ methods have been substantially chosen over ‘retributive’ ones (See Fig2 below).

Fig 2.    Which two or three of the following factors would do most to reduce crime?    (Source: Allen 2004)

It would seem then, that though ‘on the surface’ UK citizens are tough, on a deeper, possibly even a subconscious level; they prefer crime solutions that ‘restore’ them as individual victims and their society as a whole.  This social philosophy is embodied in the often repeated statement, “Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime.”

A theme against ‘division’ has been present throughout this essay.   Indeed, it is arguable that variant criminological constructs are incompatible with the concept of restoration anyway.   Whilst Christie posits a fundamental social need for diversity there are historical examples of socio-political unification that have successfully achieved huge societal endeavours.  Victory in the Second World War gave this nation’s populace a collective desire for change and improvement that resulted in Atlee’s landslide election victory over the ‘victorious’ Prime Minister Churchill.  Even though this was an almost ‘unthinkable’ outcome, in fact it had been set in motion by the report produced by the Beveridge Commission in 1942.  According to Gazeley and Thane the wartime coalition government “set out to promise and to plan for a better future… so that the population continued to believe that the war was worth fighting and suffering for” (1998, p203).

It is not difficult to argue the existence of an almost similar situation in the present day, in society’s attitude towards the ‘problem of crime’.  Perhaps the failure of the ‘Social Democratic’ project hinged upon its inability to adapt to the changing circumstances of public need.  If that is true, then a successful outcome to a ‘restorative / retributive’ project must be dynamic and ongoing, where, whenever possible, a continuum of balance is maintained between offender and victim, individual and community.  To restore our collective faith in society’s ability to deal with crime our academics and politicians must take on a long-term view, expounded as a ‘consensus solution’ and possibly even supplemented with an element of ‘retributive compulsion’ that completely overrides the short-term concerns inherent in electioneering and media sales strategies.  Our collective concern with ‘crime’ and ‘punishment’ must be ‘lessened’, whilst the alleviation of ‘harm’ and the resolution of ‘conflict’ is ‘visibly’ given a higher prioritisation; these are methods of achieving a restorative / retributive ‘equilibrium’, for in the final analysis, all forms of ‘justice’ are, by definition, ‘restorative / retributive’.

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References

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Thoroughly researched, the preceding paragraph is included without references, to highlight the paucity of material, to date provided by the Open University for students of this course, on ‘crimes of the powerful’, concerning internal state-sanctioned violence specific to police brutality; despite clear and continuous evidence that government arm is “rapidly increasing, (its) technological and quasi-military capacities shamelessly strengthened (and) discretionary powers of… detention and arrest liberally extended” (Box in McLaughlin et al, 2003, p271). However, it must also be conceded that research in such matters is scarce anyway, with some pertinent data unavailable to the public.

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This essay will consider some of the reasons for public ambivalence towards crimes of the powerful. It will do this by positing the existence of a social construction around the term ‘ambiguity’ and exploring some of its components. Other factors affecting public consciousness of such crimes will also be briefly examined, but, due to space restriction, the concentration is as stated above. The essay will show both ‘inadvertent’ and ‘deliberate’ aspects of the social construction of ‘ambiguity’, arguing that the latter comprise methods of social control which hinder greater public awareness of this category of offence. It will be suggested that the use of such strategies create sufficient social harm to warrant a central consideration when examining ‘powerful crimes’.

In a thesis on changing public attitudes, Ryan suggests modern, non-hierarchical society, with its new communication technologies, is not as ‘unquestioning’ towards authority as once it was. Quoting Inglehart, he states that when creating new social policy, the public now “engage in… ‘elite-challenging’, as opposed to ‘elite-directed’ activities” (Inglehart in Ryan, 2004, p7). A recent BBC News article reporting a 15% increase in complaints against the police appears to confirm attitudinal changes towards authority. The IPCC chairman stated this rise demonstrated that the public had “greater confidence that it is worth complaining” (13/12/06, p1). It could be argued all this indicates a new trend in social awareness that might eventually outgrow current academic thinking about public ambivalence. Nevertheless, the weight of present research shows that “crimes of legitimate business and public institutions… have a much lower public profile” (Hughes & Langan, 2001, p 241). So what underlies the overall lack of clarity in these offences?

Perusal of the beginning of a dissertation on corporate and organised crime (Hughes and Langan, 2001, pp 240 – 251) highlights regular use of the term ‘ambiguity’. Later text includes alternative references: “far from obvious”, “highly complex”, “blurred” (Hughes & Langan, 2001, pp 252, 253, 271). Although these terms are used to describe different socio-political conditions that either generate or react to ‘ambiguity’; it is necessary at this stage to draw attention to the overall effects that ‘ambiguous’ circumstances might have on any society. If a social construction of ‘ambiguity’ exists then it is formed from an accumulation of such effects, which can be divided into two categories: deliberately created effects and ‘inadvertent’ effects, which arise indirectly from interactions between various social groups, such as media, criminologists, law enforcement agencies and politicians.
Although Marxist ideology doesn’t require a construction of ambiguity, it does supply credence to it, by positing social effects which have been deliberately created. Marxist concepts cogently explain an anti-capitalist perspective of social control, arguing that laws are purposely geared towards protecting economic power. Snider suggests “The state is reluctant to pass or enforce stringent laws against pollution… health and safety, or monopolies. Such measures frighten off much sought-after investment and engender the equally dreaded ‘loss of confidence’” (Snider in Haralambos & Holborn, 2004, p353). Whilst new laws might not be passed, certain economic conditions can cause existing law to be relaxed. In the global recession of the 1980s both Western and former Communist governments began to ‘deregulate’ in the hope of assisting market forces. These were deliberate policies that inadvertently caused considerable social harm, by increasing “the scale of fraud and corruption, leading to the collapse of banks (and) destabilisation of institutions such as the insurance brokers Lloyds” (Hughes & Langan, 2001, p 270). More recently, the UK government has added to ambiguity in public awareness by cancelling a Serious Fraud Office inquiry into BAE Systems bribing of Saudi businessmen. Though officially denied, it has been generally alleged that the government was afraid of losing a lucrative defence contract. The BBC reported LibDem spokesman David Heath claiming the inquiry’s cancellation as ‘extraordinary’; “the last nail in the coffin of so-called ethical foreign policy” (19/12/06, p1).

Positing ‘deliberate’ factors in the construction of ambiguity creates the risk of being associated with ‘conspiracy theory’. In a British Society of Criminology article, entitled ‘Behind the line of truncheons: Crimes of the Powerful and the Policing of Valid Knowledge’, Whyte shows that present government policy towards funding academic research is based on a ‘principle of utility’. “In other words, the enduring logic of the restructuring of university research is that the market must… be ever more finely tuned to the requirements of business or the state” (2002, p2). It is doubtful that these ‘requirements’ are overly concerned with critical self-analysis. Whyte continues, citing Lacey and an article co-written with Tombs: “This tendency… reinforces criminology’s historical concern with a narrow definition of crime, almost exclusively committed by poor and relatively powerless offenders” (Lacey, Tombs & Whyte in Whyte, 2002, p5).

In the same BSC article Whyte highlights another social effect of present government policy, which is arguably ‘inadvertent’: A new direction and impetus to law enforcement strategies was encapsulated in the Crime and Disorder Act (1998). The thrust of this legislation was to establish local partnerships, comprised of pertinent agencies that would recognise and respond to local ‘community safety’ issues. Whyte reports that official guidelines recommend a number of non-statutory organisations that could be contacted and enrolled by these partnerships because of their expertise in crime and disorder: “Although those… mentioned are large criminal justice voluntary agencies with established links to the state (NACRO, Crime Concern, Neighbourhood Watch, Victim Support), the tone (suggests) that community groups with a broad interest in ‘community safety’ should be considered for inclusion” (2002, p6). Whyte acknowledges that one effect of this strategy could be to allow communities to expand standard definitions of ‘crime’ by including such issues as public health or pollution. If that is so then it lends itself to the assertion of a trend of ‘attitudinal change’ posited at the beginning of this essay. However, despite the gist of ‘inclusion’ expressed in these guidelines, Whyte points out that neither crimes committed by business or state receive mention. He states that the wording of the guideline actually sets up a ‘rhetorical obstacle’ to focussing on such crimes and he quotes from the Home Office ‘Guidance of Statutory Crime and Disorder Partnerships’ to highlight this point: “Businesses are central to the life of the communities and of course, suffer from the consequences of crime… Police and local authorities will be expected to listen to the views of the business sector and to encourage their active participation” (2002, p6, emphasis added). Again, the issue of self-criticism is raised, but, for the purposes of this essay, it is suggested that Whyte’s ‘rhetorical obstacle’ may well have been ‘inadvertent’. It is for conspiracy theorists to debate otherwise.
The mysterious nature of ‘ambiguity’ means that some ‘inadvertent’ circumstances may be included for what they don’t bring to the social construction. For example, it could be argued that most forms of awareness are enhanced by ‘fear’. ‘Fear of victimisation’ is a recognised social effect of crime, a subject discussed in criminological theory and also included in surveys and statistics. However, “many white-collar crimes are ‘crimes without victims’” (Haralambos & Holborn, 2004, p345). Muncie cites Walkllate and Downes: “The ‘fear of crime thesis’… concentrates more on unpredictable violence than… where victimisation is indirect and dispersed, as in corporate crime” (2001, p62). It could therefore be posited that ‘ambiguity’ is further constructed by absence of fear in the public consciousness when they learn about crimes of the powerful.

Another ‘absence’ to that social construction is created by a general lack of media attention. In a previous essay on media representations of crime this author considered the deliberate use of fear, asserting that “overall evidence suggests that news corporations exploit the liberty guaranteed to them by ‘freedom of the press’ to turn public fear into political power and profit” (Unpublished, 2007, p6). Contrast this with Levi’s comments on media reaction to crimes of the powerful: “Media neglect of business crime… is explicable by laziness, investigative cost… the invisible nature of the crime and the deviousness of progenitors, and by the difficulty of presenting it simply in the human terms expected by mass audiences” (Levi in Hughes & Langan, 2001, p 252).

This essay has so far attempted to demonstrate that there is a social construction around the term ‘ambiguity’. The up-to-date examples, chosen to highlight different elements of that construction, also show how it is conditioned by time and environment. What has not been discussed is why such a construction would exist. The short answer is that the deliberately constructed elements of ‘ambiguity’ are a form of social control. There is no space here to discuss the details of diverse sociological theories, but from Durkheim onwards most theorists have at least reviewed the ‘functional prerequisite’ argument which posits the reality of ‘social stratification’ within all societies; in other words, the existence of leaders and led. Box lists twelve sociologists who, over two decades, “have produced evidence… that criminal law categories are ideological reflections of the interests of particular powerful groups”; in this case, the leaders. Box goes on to define criminal law categories as “resources, tools, instruments, designed and then used…” (Box in McLaughlin et al, 2003, p275). This essay asserts that the social construction of ‘ambiguity’ is another implement that exists in cohort with criminal law categories. It is comprised of deliberate obscuration strategies designed to cloud public awareness of powerful crimes and thwart both criminal and academic investigation. The construction is further enhanced with the indirect consequences of those strategies, which, although produced ‘inadvertently’, can be later employed to further the concealment of such offences. As evidence of such a construction the essay has examined authoritarian policies which are posited as the present-day components of ‘ambiguity’, including ‘deliberate’ cancellation of a fraud inquiry, the rationalisation placed on research grants and the ‘inadvertent’ effects of redefining ‘community safety’.
The outcomes of powerful crimes have elsewhere been shown to involve levels of social harm that dwarf both the proceeds and victims of powerless street-crime. But the use of ‘ambiguous’ social controls endanger the fundamental principles of genuine democracy. It can therefore be argued that research into any powerful crimes must, in the first instance, always consider the methods being used to obscure the subject of research. Otherwise the results of that research run the risk of renewing whatever ‘ambiguity’ already exists, in the public awareness of all powerful crimes.

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References

Book Review : ‘Heart of Darkness’ (1902) by Joseph Conrad